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The California Supreme Court Rejects
Per Se Liability For Damages Inflicted
By Illegal Public Sector Strikes
WILLIAM H. MANZ*
Despite laws in most states banning public employee strikes,' they
continue to occur. Undeterred by statutory penalties, public sector
unions persist in using the strike weapon to achieve their goals. In
only a few jurisdictions do legislatively imposed sanctions include
the possibility of lawsuits by injured parties. Alaska,2 Iowa,3 and
Kentucky4 allow employers to bring contract damage actions. Five
* Assistant Law Librarian, Adjunct Professor of Law, St. John's University Law School.
I wish thank Professor David Gregory for his comments and suggestions during the preparation
of this article.
1. For a listing of state statutory schemes, see Dripps, New Directions For The Regulation
of Public Employee Strikes, 60 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 590 (1985).
2. ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.020 (1984):
A labor contract executed in this state by a labor organization that has no local in
this state or which contract is not. to be executed by one or more of its locals in
this state may not be enforced in the courts of this state unless the labor organization
has registered with the department and complied with all regulations adopted by it.
3. IowA CODE ANN. § 20.17(5) (West 1978):
Terms of any collective bargaining agreement may be enforced by a civil action in
the district court of the county in which the agreement was made upon the initiative
of either party.
4. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 345.100(3) (1983):
Suits for violation of agreements between a public employer and a labor organization
representing fire fighters may be brought by the parties to such agreement in the
circuit court of the county of the employer or in cases where the state is the employer
in the Franklin Circuit Court.
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other states have laws providing for employer actions against unions
which have struck illegally. 5 No state has a statute expressly giving
private parties a similar right of action.
6
Accordingly, when illegal public sector strikes have resulted in
damage actions, courts have had to act without explicit legislative
guidance. They have been forced to choose between the often con-
flicting goals of modern public sector labor policy. The critical
question has been whether the alleged benefits of permitting damage
actions outweigh their acknowledged potential to disrupt public sector
labor relations.
5. See, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 447.507(4) (West 1981):
An employee organization shall be liable for any damages which might be suffered
by a public employer as a result of a violation of the provisions of s. 447.505 by
the employee organization or its representatives, officers, or agents. The circuit court
having jurisdiction over such actions is empowered to enforce judgments against
employee organizations, as defined in this part, by attachment or garnishment of
union initiation fees or dues which are to be deducted or checked off by public
employers. No action shall be maintained pursuant to this subsection until all
proceedings which were pending before the commission at the time of the strike or
which were initiated within 30 days of the strike have been finally adjudicated or
otherwise disposed of. In determining the amount of damages, if any, to be awarded
to the public employer, the trier of fact shall take into consideration any action or
inaction by the public employer or its agents that provoked or tended to provoke
the strike by the public employees. The trier of fact shall also take into consideration
any damages that might have been recovered by the public employer under subpar-
agraph (6)(a)(4).
IND. CODE ANN. § 20-7.5-1-14(b) (West 1984):
Any school corporation or school employer may, in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding, take action against any school employee organization,
any affiliate thereof, or any person aiding or abetting in a strike, for redress of
such unlawful act.
MIN. STAT. ANN. § 179A.13(1) (West Supp. 1987):
The practices specified in this section are unfair labor practices. Any employee,
employer, employee or employer organization, exclusive representative, or any other
person or organization aggrieved by an unfair labor practice as defined in this
section may bring an action for injunctive relief and for damages caused by the
unfair labor practices in the district court of the county in which the practice is
alleged to have occurred.
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 273-A:15 (1975):
Actions by or against the exclusive representative of a bargaining unit may be
brought, without respect to the amount of damages, in the superior court of the
county in which it is principally located, or where the plaintiff resides or has its
principal place of business, if the plaintiff is a resident of this state or is incorporated
in this state.
Wis. STAT. Am. § 111.89(2)(c) (West 1981 and Supp. 1987):
The occurrence of a strike and the participation therein by a state employee do not
affect the rights of the employer to deal with the strike, including:
(c) The right of the employer to request the imposition of fines, either against the
labor organization or the employee engaging therein, or to sue for damages because
of such strike activity.
6. Note, Damage Liability of Public Employee Unions For Illegal Strikes, 23 B.C.L.
REv. 1087, 1090 (1982).
1987 / Illegal Public Strikes
In 1986, in City and County of San Francisco v. Local 38,7 the
California Supreme Court rejected an employer's damage action.
This ruling is highly significant. It disapproved the 1977 California
Court of Appeal holding in Pasadena Unified School District v.
Pasadena Federation of Teacherss that illegal public sector strikes
were tortious per se. 9 Local 38 follows the judicial trend which has
emerged in illegal strike cases during the past decade. Every ruling
but Pasadena had rejected theories of liability that would have
exposed public employee unions to lawsuits from a wide range of
potential plaintiffs.
Local 38 is also notable for its almost total reliance on public
policy. In choosing public policy as the basis for its holding, the
court conforms to preceding illegal strike opinions. Although prior
decisions include such factors as legislative intent, tort doctrine or
contract theory, all were expressly influenced to varying degrees by
public policy considerations. 10
This article will examine Local 38"s rejection of per se liability. It
will also review other theories of liability utilized in illegal strike
cases. Finally, this article will consider what influence public policy
questions have on the judicial decisions.
I. THE Local 38 DECIsIoN
The Local 38 case arose out of a strike by members of the United
Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and
Pipefitting Industry of the United States and Canada, Local 38,
against the City of San Francisco. The strike was settled soon after
the city obtained a preliminary injunction against the union and its
leaders.11 The litigation resulting from the strike, however, took far
longer to resolve.
The dispute between the city and the union first reached the court
of appeals in City and County of San Francisco v. Evankovich.
12
The issue in the case was what effect section 527.3 of the Code of
7. 42 Cal. 3d 810, 726 P.2d 538, 230 Cal. Rptr. 856 (1986).
8. 72 Cal. App. 3d 100, 140 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1977).
9. City and County of San Francisco v. Local 38, 42 Cal. 3d at 812, 726 P.2d at 539,
230 Cal. Rptr. at 857. The court refers to this theory as prima facie tort, but the more
commonly used term is tort per se.
10. The exception is Pasadena Unified School Dist. v. Pasadena Federation of Teachers
which looked only to the illegality of the strike. Pasadena Unified School Dist. v. Pasadena
Fed'n. of Teachers, 72 Cal. App. 3d 100, 140 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1977).
11. Local38, 42 Cal. 3d at 812, 726 P.2d at 539, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 857.
12. 69 Cal. App. 3d 41, 137 Cal. Rptr. 883 (1977).
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Civil Procedure' 3 had on a court's right to enjoin a public employees'
strike. 14 Holding that a public strike could be enjoined, the court
reiterated that in the absence of statutory authority, public employees
in California had no right to strike.'5 The court added that the
objectives of Local 38's strike were unlawful.' 6
The city subsequently sued the union and won a jury award of
$4,080,000 in compensatory damages.17 The union appealed. Before
the court of appeal could rule, the California Supreme Court, in
County Sanitation Dist. No. 2 v. Los Angeles County Employees
Association,8 held that only public employees' strikes which threat-
ened the public's health and safety were unlawful at common law. 9
The court of appeals ruled, before being reversed by the California
Supreme Court, that there was no doubt that Evankovich had de-
clared Local 38's strike illegal, and held that the union was collaterally
estopped from contesting that issue.20 It stated that Pasadena was
not overruled by County Sanitation because the California Supreme
Court had "determined that the strike was legal." '2' Pasadena was
then relied upon to find that the strike was a "tort for which
damages may be recovered." 22 The union then appealed to the
California Supreme Court. In an opinion by Justice Broussard, with
13. CAL. Crv. PROC. CoDE § 527.3 (Vest 1979).
14. Evankovich, 69 Cal. App. 3d at 46, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 885.
15. Id. at 48, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 887. On this issue Evankovich cites to Trustees of Cal.
State Colleges v. Local 1352, S.F. State College Fed'n. of Teachers, 13 Cal. App. 3d 863,
867; 92 Cal. Rptr. 134, 136 (1970). See also, City of San Diego v. American Fed. of State
County & Mun. Employees Local 127, 8 Cal. App. 3d 308, 310-13, 87 Cal. Rptr. 258, 260-
61 (1970). Id.
16. Evankovich, 69 Cal. App. 3d at 49, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 888.
17. City and County of San Francisco v. Local 38, 42 Cal. 3d at 812, 726 P.2d at 539,
230 Cal. Rptr. at 857.
18. 38 Cal. 3d 564, 699 P.2d 835, 214 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1983), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 408
(1986). This decision has been criticized as an excessive intrusion by the judiciary into an area
properly determined by the legislature. See, Note, County Sanitation Dist. No. 2 v. Los
Angeles County Employees Association, Local 660: A Study In Judicial Legislation, 1986
B.Y.U. L. Ray. 197 (1986); Note, California Public Employees Granted Right to Strike
Without Legislative Authorization, 64 WAsH. U.L.Q. 263 (1986). Note, Has County Sanitation
Dist. No. 2 v. Los Angeles County Employees Ass'n Trashed the Traditional Prohibitions on
Public Sector Strikes?, 62 NoTm Dmo L. Ray. 435 (1987). For a more favorable view, see
Comment, Local Public Employees Right to Strike After County Sanitation District v. Los
Angeles County Employees, 17 PAc. L.J. 533 (1986); Casenote, The California Supreme Court
Confers a Limited Right to Strike Upon California's Public Employees Through Judicial Fiat,
11 U. DAYTON L. Ra,. 421 (1986).
19. County Sanitation, 38 Cal. 3d at 587, 699 P.2d at 849, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 439.
20. City and County of San Francisco v. Local 38, 217 Cal. Rptr. 167 (1985), rev'd, 42
Cal. 3d 810, 726 P.2d 538, 230 Cal. Rptr. 856 (1986).
21. Local 38 217 Cal. Rptr. at 169.
22. Id. at 169-70.
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only Justice Lucas dissenting, the court rejected per se liability,
stating "until the Legislature enacts to the contrary, the illegality of
a strike without more is not grounds for a damage suit by the [public]
employer."2
II. THEORIEs OF LIABILITY FOR UNLAWFUL PUBLIC STRUKES
Parties claiming injuries that arise from illegal public sector strikes
have utilized various causes of action. In their consideration of these
causes of action, courts have demonstrated an unwillingness to es-
tablish any broad-based theory of liability. Instead, as will be dis-
cussed in the following section, the courts have either rejected the
plaintiff's liability theories or construed them in such a manner so
as to limit their utility to only a small number of future litigants.
A. Per Se Liability
The theory of liability with the greatest potential impact on public
sector labor relations is the tort per se concept of Pasadena. The
court in Pasadena, relying on San Diego Building Trades Council v.
Garmon,24 declared that the law established a duty to refrain from
acts harmful to persons, property or rights of another, and that an
illegal act causing such harm constituted an actionable tort.Y This
meant that any illegally striking union, regardless of the service it
provided, could be potentially liable, to an employer as well as to a
wide range of third parties.
In his County Sanitation concurrence, Justice Kaus stated, "I
believe it is improper to import tort remedies that were devised for
different situations into this sensitive [public sector] labor relations
arena."' 26 This is exactly what occurred when the Pasadena court
applied Garmon v. San Diego Building Trades Council to a public
employees strike. Pasadena involved a peaceful one day strike by
school teachers. 27 Garmon was a 1955 private sector case resulting
from picketing and threatening conduct directed against a lumber-
23. City and County of San Francisco v. Local 38, 42 Cal. 3d 810, 819, 726 P.2d 538,
543, 230 Cal. Rptr. 856, 862 (1986).
24. 49 Cal. 2d 595, 320 P.2d 473 (1958), rev'd on other grounds, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
25. Pasadena Unified School Dist. v. Pasadena Fed'n. of Teachers, 72 Cal. App. 3d 110,
113, 140 Cal. Rptr. 41, 49 (1977).
26. County Sanitation Dist. No. 2 v. Los Angeles County Employees Ass'n., 38 Cal. 3d
564, 592, 699 P.2d 835, 854, 214 Cal. Rptr. 424, 443 (1985) (Kaus, J., concurring).
27. Pasadena, 72 Cal. App. 3d at 103, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 43.
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yard. 2 In addition, two opinions cited by the Garmon court in
formulating its tort doctrine, James v. Marinship Corp.29 and Loup
v. California S.R.R. Co.,30 are far removed in both time and circum-
stance from a modern public sector labor dispute.
As noted in Local 38, courts in several other states have refused
to apply Pasadena's per se liability doctrine.31 The West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals rejected a similar theory in City of
Fairmont v. Retail, Wholesale, and Department Store Union.32 The
employer asserted that the illegality of a peaceful hospital workers'
strike gave rise to a common law cause of action. In ruling for the
union, the court, rather than follow Pasadena, chose to adopt the
view of the Michigan Supreme Court in Lamphere Schools v. Lam-
phere Federation of Teachers,3 and declined to "judicially extend
under our common law powers a remedy for damages. ' 34
Lamphere most emphatically rejected per se liability. The court
declared that there was no such thing as the tort of an illegal teachers'
strike;35 such a cause of action would open a Pandora's box. 36 The
Michigan court in Lamphere went beyond a mere refusal to create a
new tort remedy. It carefully scrutinized the Michigan Public Em-
ployment Relations Act (PERA) 7 and concluded that its remedies
were exclusive.18 Accordingly, the Michigan Employment Relations
Commission was found to have sole jurisdiction when charges of
28. Garmon v. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, 45 Cal. 2d 657, 659, 291 P.2d 1, 2
(1955), vacated, 353 U.S. 26 (1957).
29. 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P.2d 329 (1944). In this case an injunction was affirmed which
restrained the corporation from firing, under a closed shop agreement, nonunion black workers.
30. 63 Cal. 97 (1883) (railroad contract).
31. City and County of San Francisco v. Local 38, 42 Cal. 3d 810, 814, 726 P.2d 538,
541, 230 Cal. Rptr. 856, 859 (1986). Not mentioned by the Local 38 court was an approving
reference to Pasadena in Boyle v. Anderson Fire Fighters Ass'n, 497 N.E.2d 1073, 1079 (Ind.
App., 1986). This opinion was handed down only one month before Pasadena's per se theory
was disapproved. Boyle arose out of an illegal firefighters' strike which took place in 1978.
The strikers not only refused to report for work, but actively interfered with efforts to
extinguish the blaze which destroyed the plaintiffs' property. This was a violation of Indiana
Code Section 35-44-3-8 (1982) which makes it a misdemeanor to interfere with a fireman in
the performance of his duty. The focus of the court's discussion was the liability of the
individual strikers. Union liability was predicated on its responsibility for the acts of its
members. Boyle, at 1083. The defendant's petition for a rehearing was denied on May 28, 1987.
As of this writing the parties have petitioned the Indiana Supreme Court to hear the case.
32. 283 S.E.2d 589 (1980).
33. 400 Mich. 104, 252 N.W.2d 818 (1977).
34. City of Fairmont, 283 S.E.2d at 595.
35. Lamphere, 400 Mich. at 129, 252 N.W.2d at 829.
36. Id. at 133, 252 N.W.2d at 831.
37. MicH. STAT. ANN. § 17.455 (Callaghan 1982) (Michigan Public Employment Relations
Act).
38. Lamphere, 400 Mich. at 112, 252 N.W.2d at 821.
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unfair labor practices or misconduct arose in the public sector.39
The Lamphere result, if also applied to third parties, would leave
such persons without a remedy. As one critic of Lamphere correctly
points out, "[ulnion defenses against sanctions sought by the public
employer would not necessarily constitute a defense to the tort claims
of private citizens if those claims did not depend on a violation of
the statute.40 Further, precluding the claims of third parties would
be contrary to the United States Supreme Court's handling of the
preemption issue.41 The United States Supreme Court has ruled that
comprehensive labor legislation will not necessarily preclude private
damage actions. 42
The nonpreemption rationale has been followed by a New York
court. The Appellate Division, Second Department, rejected union
claims that New York's public labor legislation, the Taylor Law, 43
precluded third party actions/a The court stated that the Taylor Law
''was not intended to govern public employee relations with the
general public.... ."45 The court added that when a remedy was
meant to be exclusive under the Taylor Law it was so stated. The
court held that there was no provision in-the legislation which limited
39. Id. at 117, 252 N.W.2d at 824.
40. Note, Statutory and Common Law Considerations in Defining the Tort Liability of
Public Employee Unions to Private Citizens for Damages Inflicted by Illegal Strikes, 80 MIcH.
L. REv. 1271 (1982).
41. United Constr. Workers Affiliated With United Mine Workers v. Laburnum Constr.
Corp, 347 U.S. 656 (1954). In Laburnum, the Court ruled that the National Labor Relations
Act did not preclude an employer from seeking damages for a union's tortious strike activity.
42. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). For a further
discussion of Garmon, see, Gould, The Garmon Case: Decline and Threshold of "Litigating
Elucidation," 39 U. DET. L. Rnv. 539 (1962); Michelman, State Power to Govern Concerted
Employee Activities, 74 HAgv. L. REa. 641 (1961); Schultz & Husband, Federal Preemption
Under the NLRA: A Rule in Search of a Reason, 62 DEN. U.L. REv. 531 (1985); Comment,
State Common Law Actions for Damages and the National Labor Relations Act-The Problem
of Federal Preemption, 26 Mo. L. REv. 250 (1961). After Garmon, the federal labor preemption
doctrine was increasingly eroded by a series of Supreme Court decisions. Three 1986 opinions,
however, indicate this trend may be reversed. See Wisconsin Dept. of Indus., Labor & Human
Relations v. Gould, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 1057 (1986); Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los
Angeles, 106 S. Ct. 1395 (1986); Baker v. General Motors Corp., 106 S. Ct. 3129 (1986). For
a thorough analysis of the federal preemption doctrine since Garmon, see, Gregory, The Labor
Preemption Doctrine: Hamiltonian Renaissance or Last Hurrah?, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV.
507 (1986).
43. N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 200-214 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1987) (Public Employees'
Fair Employment Act).
44. Caso v. District Council 37, 43 A.D.2d 159, 350 N.Y.S.2d 173 (2d Dept. 1973). Caso
arose out of a strike by New York City sewage treatment workers. The strike resulted in the
pollution of waters and beaches in nearby suburban Nassau County, New York. The suit was
brought by local government officials.
45. Caso, 43 A.D.2d at 163, 350 N.Y.S. at 176.
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the remedies available against a striking public employee union. 46
Private plaintiffs injured by another illegal New York City transit
strike tried to take the New York Court of Appeals a step further
in Burns, Jackson, & Miller v. Lindner.4 7 The plaintiffs argued
that, far from precluding private action, the Taylor Law actually
implied a cause of action for third party plaintiffs.
In seeking such an implied remedy, the Burns plaintiffs were
supported by highly persuasive authority from the United States
Supreme Court. At one point in time, the Supreme Court looked
more toward fulfilling legislative goals.48 However, in Cort v. Ash
the Court adopted the principle that Congressional silence created
the presumption that Congress meant to imply no such remedy.49
In dealing with the implied third party action issue, New York's
highest court structured its analysis according to Ash. As described
by the court of appeals, these criteria included: first, whether the
plaintiff is part of the class for whose especial benefit the statute
was enacted; second, whether there is any indication from the sta-
tutory language, legislative history or the statutory remedial schemes
of an intent to grant or deny a private right of action; finally,
whether allowing such an action would further the purposes of the
legislation.50
After an extensive review of the Taylor Law's legislative history,
the court held that the plaintiffs were indeed part of the class for
whose benefit the statute was enacted.51 The court, however, ruled
against an implied right of action because "the provisions of the
present statute and the history of their enactment strongly suggest
that a private action was not intended. 52 It was noted that allowing
46. Id. at 164, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 177.
47. 59 N.Y.2d 314, 451 N.E.2d 459, 464 N.Y.S.2d 712 (1983).
48. See, e.g., Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916); J.I. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
49. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). See also Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n.
of R.R. Passengers (Amtrak), 414 U.S. 453 (1974), reh's denied, 415 U.S. 952 (1974); Note,
Implication of Private Actions From Federal Statutes: From Borak to Ash, I J. CoRP. L.
371, 372 (1976).
50. Burns, 59 N.Y.2d at 325, 451 N.E.2d at 463, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 716.
51. Id. at 329, 451 N.E.2d at 465, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 718. Prior New York opinions had
produced diverse results. In Steitz v. City of Beacon, the court found no civil liability for an
individual when a city had failed to maintain proper water pressure. Steitz v. City of Beacon,
295 N.Y. 51, 57, 64 N.E.2d 704, 709 (1945). The Burns court favored, however, the result
reached in Abounader v. Strohmeyer & Arpe Co., 243 N.Y. 458, 154 N.E. 309 (1926). The
Strohmeyer court found a food packer who had violated a statutory duty liable to a private
citizen. Id. at 460, 154 N.E. at 311.
52. Burns, 59 N.Y.2d at 329, 451 N.E.2d at 465, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 718.
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private actions would further the Taylor Law goal of deterring illegal
strikes, but would be inconsistent with the primary purpose of the
Taylor Law.53 This was held to be "defus[ing] the tensions in public
employer-employee relations by reducing the penalties and increasing
reliance on negotiation and the newly created Public Employment
Relations Board [PERB] as a vehicle toward labor peace.
' 54
A key factor in the rejection of the implication theory was the
Taylor Law's complex enforcement scheme.5 5 The court held that the
enactment of such elaborate procedures strongly suggested that no
other remedies were intended.5 6 This ruling was in line with the
approach taken by the United States Supreme Court in Middlesex
County Seweage Authority v. National Sea Clammers.5 7 The Court
held that the elaborate enforcement procedures of the Federal Water
Pollution Act 58 ruled out the possibility of Congressional intent to
provide additional judicial remedies for private citizens. 9
A failure to act may also give evidence of legislative intent. In
Jamur Productions Corporation v. Quill,60 the Condon-Waldin Act
61
New York's old public labor enactment, was found to contain no
implied remedy. The legislature's subsequent failure to specifically
include private action in the Taylor Law was seen by the court as
further evidence that no implied remedy was intended.6 2
The Court of Appeals' rejection of the implication doctrine is
highly significant. As noted by the court, an implied remedy would
have provided a "private action, which would impose per se liability
without any of the limitations applicable to the common-law forms
of action .... "-6 With an implied remedy, there would have been
no inherent means of restricting the number of prospective litigants.6
Theoretically anyone who suffered injury could have brought suit.
6 5
By limiting New York plaintiffs to traditional causes of action, the
53. Id. at 329-30, 451 N.E.2d at 465-66, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 718-19.
54. Id. at 330, 451 N.E.2d at 466, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 719.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. 453 U.S. 1 (1980).
58. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982).
59. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. 1, 14 (1980).
60. 51 Misc. 2d 501, 273 N.Y.S.2d 348 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966). Jamur arose out of an
illegal New York City transit strike.
61. N.Y. Crv. SERv. LAW § 108 (McKinney 1959). (Repealed 1967.)
62. Jamur, 51 Misc. 2d at 505, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 352.
63. Burns, 59 N.Y.2d at 330, 451 N.E.2d at 466, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 719.
64. See Note, Private Damage Actions Against Public Sector Unions For Illegal Strikes,
91 HIARv. L. Ray. 1309, 1320 (1978).
65. See id.
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court of appeals provided future courts with the means of avoiding
the undesirable effects of broadly construed public union liability.
B. Intentional Tort
Aside from Pasadena, the most notable victory for a plaintiff in
an illegal public sector strike case is State v. Kansas City Firefighters.
66
Dissatisfied with traditional tort theories, the court found the union
liable to the State of Missouri in "intentional tort.''67 When consid-
ering Kansas City, the Local 38 court distinguished it from Pasadena
because the illegality of the Kansas City strike was predicated on the
violation of a statute rather than a common law proscription. 68 The
differences between the two cases are, however, more extensive. The
law applicable to Local 38,69 contains administrative remedies. In
contrast, the Missouri statute provides no administrative mechanism
or provision for enforcment. 7
0
More importantly, the decisions differ in both scope and rationale.
In Kansas City, the illegality of the union's act did not suffice to
establish its liablity. The key factor was the court's finding of an
intent to harm the employer. This intent was found because of the
certainty of the strike's harmful consequences for the employer. 71
The court stated, "it is not the violation alone [by strike] which
66. 672 S.W.2d 99 (1984). Here, the State of Missouri sought to recover damages
occasioned by the activation of the National Guard during an illegal strike in 1975. In an
earlier decision, the court had rejected the state's quasi contract action against the union. See
State of Missouri v. Kansas City Firefighters Local No. 42, 585 S.W.2d 94 (1979). For further
comment on the 1984 decision, see Note Illegal Public Employee Strikes: Allowing a Civil
Suit For Damages, 53 UMKC L. REv. 299 (1985); Note, Prima Facie Tort- A Judicial Reaction
to Public Employee Strikes in Missouri, 50 Mo. L. REV. 687 (1985).
67. Kansas City, 672 S.W.2d at 116. The court declined to rule whether a third party
could bring an action. Id. at 110.
68. City and County of San Francisco v. Local 38, 42 Cal. 3d 810, 812, 726 P.2d 538,
540, 230 Cal. Rptr. 856, 858 (1986).
69. See CAL. GoV. CODE §§ 3500-3511 (Vest 1979 & Supp. 1987).
70. Kansas City, 672 S.W.2d at 107-8. The statute in question states: "[n]othing contained
in sections 105.500 to 105.530 shall be construed as granting a right to employees covered in
sections 105.500 to 105.530 to strike." Mo. Rav. STAT. § 105.530 (1978).
71. Kansas City, 672 S.W.2d at 112. In support of this principle, the court cited Wilt v.
Kansas Area Transportation Authority, 629 S.W.2d 669, 672[5] (Mo. App. 1982), and the
Restatement. On this question, the Restatement view provides:
An intentional tort is one in which the actor intends to produce the harm that
ensues; it is not enough that he intends to perform the act. He intends to produce
the harm when he desires to bring about that consequence by performing the act.
As indicated in § 8A, he also is treated as intending that consequence if he knows
or believes that the consequence is certain, or substantially certain, to result from
his act.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 comment b (1979).
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fastens liability upon the public employees, but the intention that
harm to the public employer shall result." 72 The Missouri court added
that it was not the unlawfulness of the act "which proves the tort
and legal injury, but that the harm actually suffered was [inten-
tional] .... ,,73
Finally, unlike Pasadena, the Kansas City court was careful to
narrow the scope of its ruling. In this respect the court was in accord
with the Restatement view, "that in some cases in which a claim
may be entirely novel the court may decide to limit the liability to
the situation in which the defendant acted for the purpose of pro-
ducing the harm involved." 74 In Kansas City, the court stated, "we
confine our analysis to the public employee function in suit-fire-
fighting. '
75
C. Prima Facie Tort
The court in Kansas City briefly considered, but rejected, the
theory of prima facie tort.76 It defined this. concept as an offense
consisting of an intentional infliction of harm without sufficient
justification, by an act that would be otherwise lawful.77 Like per se
liability, this is a cause of action potentially available to a wide range
of possible plaintiffs.
In Kansas City, it was held that prima facie tort as a remedy
"does not readily transpose from the private sector to public sector
labor disputes. ' 78 The court had difficulty with two elements of the
cause of action: the lack of sufficient justification and the need for
72. Kansas City, 672 S.W.2d at 112.
73. Id.
74. RESTATEM ENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 870 comment b (1979).
75. Kansas City, 672 S.W.2d at 111.
76. Id. at 114. The court drew its definition from Porter v. Crawford & Co., 611 S.W.2d
265, 268 (1980), an insurance case. The New York definition considered in Burns is essentially
the same. See Bums, Jackson, & Miller v. Lindner, 59 N.Y.2d 314, 332, 451 N.E.2d 459,
464 N.Y.S. 2d 712 (1983). The Restatement definition is stated in more general terms.
One who intentionally causes injury to another is subject to liability to the other
for the injury, if his conduct is generally culpable and not justifiable under the
circumstances. This liability may be imposed though the actor's conduct does not
come within a traditional category of tort liability.
REsTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 870 (1979). For further comment on the prima facie tort
cause of action, see Brown, The Rise and Threatened Demise of the Prima Facie Tort Principle,
54 Nw. U.L. REv. 563 (1959); Forkosch, An Analysis of the Prima Facie Tort "Cause of
Action, " 42 CORNLm L. REv.. 465 (1957); Note, The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine in New
York-Another Writ?, 42 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 530 (1968).
77. Kansas City, 672 S.W.2d at 115.
78. Id. at 115.
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an act which would be otherwise lawful. The court held prima facie
tort to be inapplicable to an unlawful strike because the illegality of
the act deprived the union of "justification for the harm which
results to the public employer from the interruption of a vital
governmental service.
' 79
The lawful act issue was viewed with more importance by the
Appellate Division in Burns, Jackson, & Miller v. Lindner.0 Finding
ample precedent rejecting prima facie tort claims based on illegal
acts, the Appellate Division held that an illegal strike could not serve
as a predicate for the cause of action.8' The question, however, is
not as clear in its resolution. Early prima facie tort cases do not
mention a requirement that the act complained of be legal.82 The
Restatement also states that the illegality of the act may be strongly
indicative of liability.83 Accordingly, when Burns reached the court
of appeals, the lawful act question was left open.84 Citing to the
Restatement, the court of appeals stated that an unlawful act need
not be excluded as a predicate.
85
The court of appeals instead focused on the defendant's intentions.
In this respect courts have been unwilling to rule that an illegal strike
79. Id.
80. 88 A.D.2d 50, 452 N.Y.S.2d 80 (2d Dept. 1982), aff'd, 59 N.Y.2d 315, 451 N.E.2d
459, 464 N.Y.S.2d 712 (1983).
81. Burns, 88 A.D.2d at 72, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 93 (2d Dept. 1982), aff'd, 59 N.Y.2d 315,
451 N.E.2d 459, 464 N.Y.S.2d 712 (1983). A line of cases did support this holding. In Ruza
v. Ruza, 1 A.D.2d 669, 146 N.Y.S.2d 808 (Ist Dept. 1955), a complaint alleging a tortious
conspiracy was dismissed. In Brandt v. Winchell, 238 A.D. 338, 127 N.Y.S.2d 865 (Ist Dept.
1954), plaintiff alleging acts akin to libel, slander and malicious prosecution was told his action
should be based on traditional tort. In Sommer v. Kaufman, 59 A.D.2d 843, 399 N.Y.S.2d 7
(1st Dept. 1977), a cause of action alleging acts of bribery was dismissed. The only public
sector union case where the prima facie tort cause of action was upheld was Board of Education
of Farmingdale Union Free School District v. Farmingdale Classroom Teachers Association,
38 N.Y.2d 397, 343 N.E.2d 278, 380 N.Y.S.2d 635 (1975), involving an otherwise lawful
activity, the subpoenaing of witnesses by the union.
82. See, Mogul S.S. Co., Ltd. v. McGregor, Gow & Co., 23 Q.B.D. 598 (1889), aff'd,
[1892] A.C. 25; Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 204 (1904). For a discussion of the origins
of the doctrine, see Note, The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine, 52 CoLrm. L. REv. 503, 503-505
(1952).
83. "[O]f course acts that are in violation of civil or criminal statutes or that are tortious
with respect to third parties may be strongly indicative of liability." REsTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF ToRTs § 870 comment h (1979).
84. Bums, Jackson, & Miller v. Lindner, 59 N.Y.2d at 333, 451 N.E.2d at 468, 464
N.Y.S.2d at 721.
85. Id. The court's mention of the issue was criticized by Chief Justice Cooke. He states,
"[i]nasmuch as the court expressly does not now decide whether unlawful acts can be the
predicate for prima facie tort, the abstract discussion of the merits of the proposition (pp 332-
333) is jurisprudentially unwise and will serve only to confuse litigants and the courts." 59
N.Y.2d at 337, 451 N.E.2d at 470, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 723. (Cooke, C.J., concurring).
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was aimed at individual third parties. 86 In Jamur Productions Cor-
poration v. Quill, the union escaped liability because the strike "was
in actuality directed at no one in particular, except for the employer
who did not sue." '8 7
The intent standard applied by the court of appeals in Burns went
beyond merely having to demonstrate an intent to harm the plaintiff.
The court ruled against the plaintiffs because they failed to plead
"disinterested malevolence. ' 88 There could be no recovery unless the
defendant acted with a malicious motive "unmixed with any other
and exclusively directed to injury and damage of another.
8 9
Although this standard may be criticized as overly strict,90 it is a
better choice than the lawful act requirement of the Appellate Divi-
sion. Under that theory, a defendant would be able to lide behind
the unlawfulness of his own actions.91 In effect, however, the court
of appeals' approach is no more helpful to prospective plaintiffs than
that of the Appellate Division. Given the demonstrated reluctance of
courts to find that illegal public sector strikes were aimed at third
parties, it would be extremely difficult to prove that the union struck
with the sole motive of injuring an employer or member of the
public.
New York is not the only jurisdiction where prima facie tort failed
as a cause of action because of a perceived lack of malevolence. In
Maidlow v. City of Toledo, the Ohio Court of Appeals refused to
86. One exception was the New York Supreme Court, Special Term, which delivered the
initial opinion in Burns. Here, the court stated, "it is generally recognized that the public
union strikes are necessarily aimed at the public, not the public employer." 108 Misc.2d 458,
468, 437 N.Y.S.2d 895, 903 (Sup. Ct., Queens County 1981), modified, 88 A.D.2d 50, 452
N.Y.S.2d 80 (2d Dept. 1982), aff'd, 59 N.Y.2d 314, 451 N.E.2d 314, 464 N.Y.S.2d 712 (1983).
87. Jamur Prod. Corp. v. Quill, 51 Misc.2d 501, 509, 273 N.Y.S.2d 348, 355 (1966). See
also Burke & Thomas v. Int'l Org. of Masters, 600 P.2d 1282 (Wash. S.Ct. 1978) (the
Washington Supreme Court held that striking ferry workers did not intend to harm resort
owners injured by their strike). In Maidlow v. City of Toledo, No. L-81-120, slip op. (Ohio
Ct. App. Dec. 4, 1981) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file) (the Ohio Court of Appeals stated
that a public employees strike was directed at the public generally, not at anyone in particular).
88. Burns, Jackson, & Miller v. Lindner, 59 N.Y.2d 314, 333, 451 N.E.2d 459, 468, 464
N.Y.S.2d 712, 721 (1983).
89. Id. This strict standard derives from Beardsley v. Kilmer, 236 N.Y. 80, 140 N.E. 203
(1923).
90. There are two other standards. See, e.g., A.T.I., Inc. v. Ruder & Finn, Inc., 42
N.Y.2d 454, 368 N.E.2d 1230, 398 N.Y.S.2d 864 (1977) (the court looked to the defendant's
justification for his acts); Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 195 (1904) (utilized a balancing test,
to determine if malice was the dominant motivation). See also, Note, The Prima Facie Tort
Doctrine: Acknowledging the Need for Judicial Scrutiny of Malice, 63 B.U.L. Rnv. 1101,
1117-25 (1983).
91. See, e.g., Wyandotte Transportation Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 202 (1967)
(endorsing civil suits for illegal acts).
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apply the theory to a case arising from the death of a bus driver
murdered while the police participated in a city employees' strike.
92
It was held that "the facts of the instant case do not support the
existence of an essential element of prima facie tort - intentional
harm, or full knowledge or malevolence that the action will cause
harm to the plaintiff.
'93
The Maidlow court also objected to the nature of the plaintiff's
damages. Noting that prima facie tort had been traditionally applied
to cases involving economic harm and trade losses, the court declined
to expand the doctrine to include noneconomic losses and personal
injuries. 94 It added that "[u]ntil the existence and application of the
prima facie tort theory is more clearly delineated in Ohio, appellants
must seek alternative remedies in recovery." 95
D. Interference With Business
The portion of Pasadena left intact by Local 38 was the right of
an employer to seek redress for tortious inducement of breach of
contract. 96 Third parties seeking compensation for interference with
their prospective contractual relationships have not been successful.
97
In Burns, at the Appellate Division level, the court followed general
92. Maidlow v. City of Toledo, No. L-81-120, slip op. (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 4, 1981)
(LEXIS, State Library, Ohio file) at 19. Maidlow arose out of a strike by a group of public
employee unions, including the police. The court never declared the strike illegal. Under a
former section of the Ferguson Act, a public employee who failed to report for work was not
officially on strike until he was notified of the fact by his employer. Onio REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4117.04 (Anderson 1980). This notification was never sent to the Toledo strikers. Maidlow,
No. L-81-120 at 6. It should be noted that the plaintiffs' chances of maintaining a prima facie
tort cause of action were poor in any case since the doctrine had not been judicially recognized
in Ohio.
93. Maidlow, No. L-81-120 at 19.
94. Id. at 20.
95. Id. at 20-21.
96. City and County of San Francisco v. Local 38, 42 Cal. 3d 810, 819, 726 P.2d 538,
543, 230 Cal. Rptr. 856, 862 (1986).
97. A plaintiff was successful in a tortious interference with contract action in an English
decision. Falconer v. ASLEF and NUR, [1986] IRLR 331 (County Court, Sheffield) (LEXIS,
Enggen library, cases file). Here, the plaintiff was inconvenienced and put to extra expense
by a rail strike. As an advance purchaser of a ticket, the plaintiff was found to be in privity
of contract with British Rail. It was held that the union's constructive knowledge of this
contract was sufficient to establish liability. This represented a departure from past English
cases which required actual knowledge. See, e.g., Dimbleby & Sons Ltd. v. N.U.J., [1984] 1
W.L.R. 427 and Merkur Island Shipping Corp. v. Laughton, 2 A.C. 570, [1983].
Like Kansas City, Falconer was careful to limit the scope of its opinion. The court stated
that its judgment related only to those cases where the facts were identical to the case at hand.
That Falconer could have been litigated required unusual circumstances. The Trade Union
and Labour Relations Act of 1974, 22 & 23 Eliz. 2, ch. 52, §§ 13-14, grants unions immunity
from tort liability for actions in furtherance of a trade dispute. In Falconer, the union failed
to ballot its members before calling the strike. This failure removed their tort immunity under
the Trade Union Act of 1984, 32 & 33 Eliz. 2, ch 49, § 10.
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New York precedent in holding that the defendants' knowledge must
be specified. 9 The court of appeals later characterized the interference
caused by the transit strike as "incidental. '" 99 It concluded by stating
"as a matter of policy we should not recognize a common law cause
of action for such incidental interference when the Legislature has,
in establishing an otherwise comprehensive labor plan for the gov-
ernance of public employer-employee relations, failed to do so." 1°°
As in prima facie tort, a claim of business interference can also
run afoul of the element of intent. 10 Burke & Thomas, Inc. v.
International Organization of Masters,02 is a prime example of judicial
determination not to find such intent. If ever a plaintiff could have
hoped to prevail on a claim of business interference it was here. The
striking union cut off all ferry service (the only public access) to
some popular island vacation resorts. 0 3 Making the situation even
more blatant, the strike was deliberately timed to coincide with the
Labor Day weekend? °4
Showing an obvious aversion to a broad based theory of union
liability, the Washington Supreme Court failed to find liability be-
cause the object of the strike was to pressure the employer, not to
injure the third parties. 0 5 Like the Burns court, the Burke & Thomas
court stressed the policy basis of its decision.' °6 Strikes and resultant
harm to third parties and their contractual relationships were no
longer a part of tort law, but were instead now part of labor law. 07
E. Public Nuisance
A traditional common law cause of action commentators suggest
for use in illegal public sector strike cases is public nuisance. 08 The
98. Burns, 88 A.D.2d 50, 72, 452 N.Y.S.2d 80, 93 (2d Dept. 1982).
99. Bums, Jackson, & Miller v. Lindner, 59 N.Y.2d 314, 335, 451 N.E.2d 459, 469
N.Y.S.2d 712, 722 (1983).
100. Id.
101. See notes 86-91 supra and accompanying text.
102. 600 P.2d 1282 (Wash. 1978).
103. Id. at 1283.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1285.
106. Id. at 1287.
107. Id. at 1288, citing 4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, p.2 (1979). The Burke &
Thomas court states, "[o]bviously the law of labor disputes and their effect on contractual
relations has ceased to be regarded as a part of Tort Law and has become an integral part of
the general subject of Labor Law, with all its statutory and administrative regulations, both
state and federal." The court contrasted this statement with the extensive treatment of the
tortious nature of illegal strikes found in the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, pp. 91-181 (1939). This
difference was noted by the Local 38 court. Local 38, 42 Cal. 3d at 816, 726 P.2d at 541,
230 Cal. Rptr. at 859.
108. See, e.g., Note, Private Damage Actions, supra note 64, at 1322. For a full discussion
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Restatement (Second) of Torts defines public nuisance as an unrea-
sonable interference with a right common to the general public.1°9
Unreasonableness is determined in part by whether the conduct
involved creates a significant interference or is proscribed by law." 0
The concept of an illegal strike as a public nuisance has found
favor with the courts. In United Steelworkers of America v. United
States,"' Justices Harlan and Frankfurter held that a government's
authority to enjoin strikes causing a national emergency was a form
of jurisdiction traditionally exercised over public nuisances.
1 2
Unfortunately for prospective plaintiffs, the illegality of a public
sector strike may not be sufficient to establish a public nuisance
cause of action. For any chance of success, the interrupted service
must be of vital importance. As one commentator points out, one
could hardly maintain an action in public nuisance against a union
whose illegal strike had closed the municipal golf course or swimming
pool."3
Even a strike affecting a vital service may not be a sufficient
predicate. In Fulenwider v. Firefighters Association,"4 the plaintiff
seemed to have been in good position to establish the existence of a
public nuisance; lack of fire protection surely creates a potentially
dangerous situation. In fact, the Tennessee Court of Appeals had
little difficulty in upholding the plaintiff's right to bring the suit.
The Tennessee court stated that "the complaint alleges facts from
which it could be concluded that the defendants calling on or
endorsing the strike, an illegal act, have created a condition which
could be found to be a public nuisance.""1
5
In reversing, the Tennessee Supreme Court did not rule that a
firefighter's strike could never be a public nuisance. It held that mere
failure to report to work did not create the condition." 6 The court
stated that a public nuisance would have existed only if the strikers
of the public nuisance cause of action, see Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52
VA. L. REv. 997 (1966).
109. REsTATAmBNT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs, § 821B (1979).
110. Id.
111. 361 U.S. 39 (1959).
112. Id. at 61 (Harlan & Frankfurter, J.J., concurring). See also Caso v. Dist. Council
37, 43 A.D.2d 159, 163, 350 N.Y.S.2d 173, 178 (1973) (suggesting that a nuisance cause of
action would be an appropriate remedy for the plaintiffs).
113. Note, Private Damage Actions, supra note 64, at 1330.
114. 649 S.W.2d 268 (1982).
115. 1979-81 PBC (CCH) 36,956, at 37,758 (Tenn. App. 1981), rev'd, 649 S.W.2d 268
(Tenn. 1982).
116. Fulenwider, 649 S.W.2d at 272.
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had started fires or had actively interfered with fire protection
services.
117
This strict standard sharply limits the future utility of the cause
of action. For any chance of success, a plaintiff in Tennessee will
have to demonstrate the kind of active interference with a vital public
service that actually took place during the Kansas City circumstan-
ces. 118
The reasoning of the Tennessee Supreme Court is difficult to
justify when one considers the dangers inherent in a firefighters'
strike. More convincing is the dissenting opinion of Justice Fones,
who states:
I seriously question the validity of the distinction the majority
makes between "direct action" such as blocking the streets and
"indirect action" the legal label they place on an illegal strike. If
the inevitable result of an illegal strike is to create an unreasonably
dangerous condition endangering the lives and property of the
citizenry, I find it totally immaterial whether the proximate cause
thereof was a direct or indirect act. 119
If the court was determined to rule against the Fulenwider plaintiff,
it would have been on firmer ground stressing the causation issue
since the evidence presented on this question was described as mea-
ger.120
Contrasted with Fulenwider in rationale, but not in the ultimate
result, is Burns, Jackson, & Miller v. Lindner.12' Like the firefighters
in Fulenwider, the transit workers in Burns merely failed to report
for work. However, unlike Fulenwider there was no dispute over
whether the strike had created a public nuisance. 22 This was of no
help to the plaintiffs whose cause of action ultimately failed on the
issue of special damages.
On the subject of special damages, Prosser states:
It must be repeated again that the business interference, and the
type of pecuniary loss resulting from it must be particular to the
plaintiff, or to a limited group in which he is included. When it
117. Id.
118. See State v. Kansas City Firefighters, 672 S.W.2d 99 (1984).
119. Fulenwider, 649 S.W.2d at 274 (Fones, J., dissenting).
120. Id.
121. 59 N.Y.2d 314, 451 N.E.2d 459, 464 N.Y.S.2d 712 (1983).
122. The defendant union made no attempt to contest this issue, probably because the
disruptive effect of their strike was so obvious. One commentator states that the inconvenience
resulting from a transit strike is "no less than that caused by the classic public nuisance of
the obstruction of a public highway." Note, Private Damage Actions, supra note 64, at 1329.
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becomes so general and widespread as to affect a whole community,
or a very wide area within it, the line is drawn. 23
In reality, the Burns plaintiffs were not in a favorable position to
claim special damages. The losses they alleged, lost business profits
and additional out-of-pocket expenses, were of the kind suffered by
innumerable businesses throughout the city. Previously, in Jamur
Productions Corporation v. Quill, a company alleged similar damages
resulting from a transit strike and the court determined that the
losses were no different from those of many others. 24 As one
commentator states, "it would seem that economic losses which result
from such situations as a transit strike do not constitute particular
injury and are therefore not recoverable under the public nuisance
doctrine."'7
Surprisingly, the plaintiffs in Burns were initially able to overcome
the special damages obstacle. Engaging in some dubious reasoning,
the Supreme Court, Special Term, held that the injury to the public
was the disturbance of public transportation and an impaired effi-
ciency of city services. 12 This interpretation meant that the law firms'
economic losses were indeed particular to them and other members
of their class.
On appeal, the Appellate Division rejected this reasoning, stating
that the damages suffered were common throughout the city.' 27 The
court of appeals agreed, holding that "[t]he economic loss which
results from a transit strike is not recoverable in a private action for
public nuisance because the class includes all members of the public
who are affected by the strike."''
Thus, like Fulenwider v. Firefighter Association, the court of
appeals' opinion, while not ruling out public nuisance as a cause of
123. Prosser, supra note 108, at 1015. The Burns plaintiffs had little problem establishing
that economic loss could qualify as special damages. There is sufficient New York precedent
on this issue. See, e.g., Wakeman v. Wilbur, 147 N.Y. 657, 42 N.E. 341 (1895); Francis v.
Schoellkopf, 53 N.Y. 152 (1873).
124. Jamur Prod. Corp. v. Quill, 51 Misc.2d 501, 509, 273 N.Y.S.2d 348, 355.
125. Note, Private Damage Actions, supra note 64, at 1331.
126. Bums, Jackson, & Miller v. Lindner, 108 Misc.2d at 475, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 895 (1981),
modified 88 A.D.2d 50, 452 N.Y.S.2d 80 (1982), aff'd 59 N.Y.2d 315, 451 N.E.2d 459, 464
N.Y.S.2d 712 (1983). This reasoning was criticized as possibly disserving the policies underlying
the special damages rule. Note, Statutory and Common Law Considerations, supra note 40,
at 1295, n. 138. In the other extreme, the Maidlow court stated that the fatal injuries of the
murdered bus driver were "not different in character or kind from the public generally."
Maidlow, No. L-81-120 at 7-8.
127. Bums, Jackson, & Miller v. Lindner, 88 A.D.2d 50, 71, 452 N.Y.S.2d 80, 93 (1982),
aff'd 59 N.Y.2d 315, 451 N.E.2d 459, 464 N.Y.S.2d 712 (1983).
128. Burns, 59 N.Y.2d at 335, 451 N.E.2d at 469, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 722.
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action against public unions, has the effect of sharply curtailing its
usefulness for future plaintiffs. Essentially eliminated by the court's
traditional interpretation of the special damages rule are actions
arising from the two most common forms of illegal strikes, those
staged by teachers and transit workers. The cause of action would
only be of value to those persons who suffer peculiar damages to
person or property because of a strike that imperils the public safety,
such as one by firemen, police, or sewage plant workers.
F. Negligence
Negligence as a cause of action in illegal strike cases presents many
difficulties for the plaintiff because of the need to show a duty of
care, foreseeability and proximate causation. The need to apply
traditional tort principles, combined with a reluctance of courts to
allow third party damage actions against public sector unions has
led courts often to find one or more of these elements lacking.
It may be quite difficult to establish that the union owes any duty
to the public or to any individual citizen. Very often, the govern-
mental unit itself owes no duty to provide the service in question.
In Maidlow v. City of Toledo, the court found that the union owed
no duty to the deceased bus driver.1 29 Even the Tennessee Court of
Appeals opinion in Fulenwider, which was otherwise favorable to
the plaintiff, stated that the union owed no duty to an individual
property owner to furnish adequate fire protection.
30
This reasoning has been criticized by one commentator who urges
courts to establish that unions owe a duty not to interfere with
governmental public service.' 31 This position was recently taken by
the court in Boyle v. Anderson Firefighters Association.132 The court
in Boyle held that the striking firefighters under both their labor
contract and fire department rules "owed the Owners a duty not to
129. Maidlow v. City of Toledo, No. L-81-120, slip op. (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 4, 1981)
(LEXIS, States Library, Ohio file) at 15.
130. 1979-81 PBC (CCH) 36,956, at 37,757. See also Jackson v. Byrne, 738 F.2d 1443
(7th Cir. 1984). This case arose out of an illegal firefighters' strike in Chicago. Here, the
plaintiffs structured their lawsuit as a civil rights action. In rejecting the cause of action, the
court concluded "[t]he firefighters may have violated state law forbidding work stoppages by
essential civil servants and could very well be liable to plaintiffs under principles of state tort
law. Nonetheless, the firefighters, standing under no constitutional duty to act, did not effect
a deprivation within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 1446.
131. See Note, Statutory and Common Law Considerations, supra note 40, at 1278.
132. 497 N.E.2d 1073 (1986). See also supra note 31.
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strike or, conversely, the Strikers owed the Owners a duty to fight
the fire."' 33
Even if a duty of care can be established, the element of causation
may prove fatal to the plaintiff's cause of action. It may be difficult
to demonstrate that the harm claimed would not have occurred but
for the strike. In Maidlow, the court held that even if negligence
could be shown, the criminal act of a third party broke the "causal
chain of negligence as a matter of law.''14 It also stated that the
plaintiff's injuries were remote and indirect. 3 5 As previously noted,
the Fulenwider court was unwilling to hold that the plaintiff's prop-
erty was destroyed as a direct result of the strike. The court in
Fulenwider characterized the damage as an incidental byproduct of
the work stoppage. 13
6
This reluctance to finding a causal link between the plaintiff's
injuries and the strike has also occurred in cases where it is clear
that no harm would have been suffered if the strike had not taken
place. In Jamur Productions Corporation v. Quill, the damages the
plaintiff claimed were caused by the transit strike were held to be
too remote and indirect to permit recovery.'37 In Burke & Thomas,
the court reiterated the theme that the effect of strikes "on remote
parties is only incidental, even though it may be substantial." '138
Finally, there has also been a refusal to find the plaintiff's damages
foreseeable. This reasoning was used in both Maidlow39 and Jamur.40
Even under traditional standards this position is highly questionable.
As one court correctly pointed out, it was "the very inevitability of
damage which led to the prohibition of public strikes.'1 4'
G. Conspiracy
Another cause of action which might be available to a broad range
of plaintiffs is conspiracy. Conspiracy, however, has been brushed
133. Id. at 1081.
134. Maidlow, No. L-81-120 at 13.
135. Id. at 7-8, citing the trial court, 1981-83 PBC (CCH) 37,321 (Ohio C.P. 1981).
136. 649 $.W.2d at 272. This conclusion was criticized by the Boyle court which stated,
"the destruction of property by fire does not seem to be merely an incidental or secondary
by-product of an illegal strike .. . ." Id. at 1082. The court was clearly influenced by the
fact that strikers were at the scene and refused to assist in fighting the fire.
137. 51 Misc.2d at 509, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 355.
138. 600 P.2d 1282, 1286 (Wash. 1978).
139. Maidlow, No. L-81-120 at 19.
140. Jamur, 51 Misc.2d at 509, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 355.
141. Caso v. Dist. Council 37, 43 A.D.2d at 163, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 177.
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aside by those courts which have considered it. In Burns, the Ap-
pellate Division followed longstanding New York precedent in re-
jecting the cause of action, stating there was no such independent
tort as conspiracy 42 Even the court in Boyle v. Anderson Firefighters
Association, was most unsympathetic to the union, and declined to
find that the independent tort existed. 43
H. Contract
A final claim made by third party plaintiffs in illegal strike cases
is that they, as members of the public, were third party beneficiaries
of the union's collective bargaining agreement with the public em-
ployer. As one commentator states, "[iln the case of transit services,
. .. those who rely on others being able to use the services could be
intended beneficiaries."' 44 One court has held that if the contract
includes a no strike clause, unions may be liable for damages if they
violate such a clause.145
An initial problem for the plaintiff may be that the union's contract
had expired. As one commentator states, once a contract has expired,
a union's obligation not to strike can no longer be based on a
contractual duty. 46 This is what frustrated the plaintiffs' contract
based cause of action in Burns, where the terms of the contract were
not deemed to have survived its expiration1 47
However, even if the contract is still in force, the plaintiffs still
must overcome the traditional judicial attitude toward defendants
who have agreed to provide public services for governments. This
doctrine, as expressed in the 1928 landmark New York case of Moch
v. Rensselaer Water Co. 41 states that in order for the plaintiff to
prevail, he must show that the contract in question provided com-
pensation for those injured as a result of its breach. 49 The rationale
of this rule, the need to protect contractors from potentially ruinous
liability, has been criticized as unnecessary in the public sector
142. Bums, Jackson, & Miller v. Lindner, 88 A.D.2d 50, 73, 452 N.Y.S.2d 80, 93 (1982).
See, e.g., Hutchins v. Hutchins, 7 Hill 104 (N.Y. 1845). At the court of appeals level, the
Burns plaintiff did not plead conspiracy as a cause of action.
143. Boyle v. Anderson Firefighters Ass'n., 497 N.E.2d 1073, 1079 (1986).
144. Note, Private Damage Actions, supra note 64, at 1322.
145. Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co 370 U.S. 238 (1962), overruled in part on other
grounds by Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerk's Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
146. Note, Private Damage Actions, supra note 64, at 1321.
147. Burns, 59 N.Y.2d at 336, 451 N.E.2d at 470, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 723.
148. 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928).
149. Id. at 164, 159 N.E. at 897.
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context. As is correctly pointed out, the union can always avoid
liability by not striking. 150
Such criticism notwithstanding, it is the traditional approach that
has been favored by those courts which have considered the problem
with regard to public sector strikes. In Burns, the court held the
plaintiffs were only incidental beneficiairies, adding that imposition
of liability on a contractual basis would impose a crushing burden
on the defendants.'-' Similar sentiments were expressed in Burke &
Thomas where the court stated that the "creation of third party
beneficiaries requires that the parties assume a direct obligation to
the intended beneficiary at the time they enter the agreement."' 52
This continued application of traditional contract law would rule
out, for all practical purposes, third party beneficiary actions against
public sector unions. It would be a rare union that would enter into
an agreement stipulating to liability as to members of the public
injured by a breach. As one commentator predicts, contract-based
actions will prove less useful to third parties than to employers.'5 3
IV. PUBLIC POLICY
The outright rejection or limitation of the above causes of action
obviously is not solely the product of legal theorizing. Underlying
these judicial opinions are perceptions about the public policy impli-
cations of allowing employers or third parties to bring damage actions
against public employee unions. As previously noted, the reason that
the Local 38 decision stands apart is the reliance upon public policy.
The court made this clear when it stated, "[o]ur principal objection
to Pasadena's prima facie tort theory, however, relates not to the
lack of precedential support, but to the relative roles of the courts
and the Legislature in establishing rules to govern labor-management
relations.' 5 4
150. Note, Private Damage Actions, supra note 64, at 1327; Note, Damage Liability, supra
note 6, at 1135- 36.
151. Burns, 59 N.Y.2d at 337, 451 N.E.2d at 470, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 723, citing Mach, 247
N.Y. at 165, 159 N.E. at 897-98. See also, Isbrandtsen Co., Inc. v. Local 1291, Int'l
Longshoremen's Ass'n, 204 F.2d 495, 498 (3d Cir. 1953) and Kornblut v. Chevron Oil Co.,
62 A.D.2d 831, 836-37, 407 N.Y.S.2d 498, (2d Dept. 1978), affl'd, 48 N.Y.2d 853, 424 N.Y.S.2d
429 (1979).
152. Burke & Thomas, Inc. v. Int'l Org. of Masters, 600 P.2d 1282, 1285 (Wash. 1978).
153. Note, Damage Liability, supra note at 1334.
154. City and County of San Francisco v. Local 38, 42 Cal. 3d 810, 815, 726 P.2d 538,
541, 230 Cal. Rptr. 856, 859 (1986).
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This need for judicial restraint has long concerned the courts. An
early example is Jamur Production Corporation v. Quill. In Jamur,
the court stated, "[i]n view of the nature of the field, [and] the
afore-expressed need for judicial restraint, ... the tortious based
causes must be held insufficient at law.' ' 55 Over ten years later, the
Burke & Thomas v. International Orgnization of Masters opinion
expressed the same belief, holding that "progress in public employee
labor relations, and the public welfare in general, are best served at
this time by a rule of judicial neutrality and restraint."'' 56 Still later,
the Fairmont court stated that "[m]ost if not all the commentators
in the labor law area agree that the complex issues in this field are
ill suited to any comprehensive judicial solution."'
' 57
Such concerns have been repeatedly noted by the California Su-
preme Court. San Diego Teacher's Association v. Superior Court'
58
stated that a court "cannot with expertise tailor its remedy to
implement the broader objectives entrusted to [the Public Employ-
ment Relations Board]."' 59 In El Rancho Unified School District v.
National Education Association, 6° the court observed that the pen-
alties available to the Public Employment Relations Board "are far
more likely to accomplish the Legislature's goal of 'foster[ing] con-
structive employment relations (§ 3540)' and 'the long-range minim-
lization of work stoppages' than an after-the-harm-is-done award of
damages.' 6' This position was reiterated by Justice Kaus concurring
in County Sanitation District No. 2 v. Los Angeles County Employees
Association.162 He stated,
[i]n the absence of a determination by the Legislature that a tort
action, resulting in a money damage award determined by a jury
many years after the strike, is the appropriate method for dealing
with public employee strikes, I do not believe the judiciary should,
on its own, embrace this "solution" to the problem. 63
155. Jamur Prod. Corp. v. Quill, 51 Misc.2d 501, 509, 273 N.Y.S.2d 348, 356 (1966).
156. Burke & Thomas v. Int'l Org. of Masters, 600 P.2d 1283, 1285 (Vash. 1979).
157. City of Fairmont v. Retail, wholesale, and Dept. Store Union, 283 S.E.2d 589,
595 (W. Va. 1980).
158. 24 Cal. 3d, 593 P.2d 838, 154 Cal. Rptr. 898 (1979).
159. Id. at 13, 593 P.2d at 846, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 901. The Public Employee Relations
Board adjudicates claims of unfair labor practices under the Education Employment Relations
Act. CAL. Gov. CODE §§ 3540-3549.3 (West 1979 & Supp. 1987).
160. 33 Cal. 3d 946, 663 P.2d 893, 192 Cal. Rptr. 123 (1983).
161. Id. at 961, 663 P.2d at 902, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 132, citing San Diego Teachers, 24
Cal. 3d at 13, 593 P.2d at 846, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 901.
162. 38 Cal. 3d 564, 592, 699 P.2d 835, 854, 214 Cal. Rptr. 424, 443 (Kaus, J., concurring).
163. Id.
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Finally, in Local 38 itself, the court stated that the area of labor
relations has been marked by a withdrawal of the judiciary and a
"steady growth of statutory and administrative regulation."' 16
This growth and the complexity of modern labor legislation has
presented courts with difficult choices. Often the same enactments
which make strikes illegal seek to promote harmonious labor rela-
tions. Public labor peace may depend as much or more on healthy
public sector unions and a true bargaining balance than on the threat
of punitive action. Thus, courts granting a right of action to an
employer or third party could be furthering a legislative goal of
deterring strikes while simultaneously undermining the legislature's
overall public sector labor scheme.
A major judicial concern has been the possibility that court im-
posed sanctions will interfere with legislatively enacted means of
dispute resolution. This factor was recognized long ago by Justice
Douglas. In his dissent in United Construction Workers With United
Mine Workers v. Laburnum, he wrote of controversies dragging on
through the courts, robbing administrative remedies of the healing
effects they were meant to have. 165 In Local 38, the court stated
"[t]here remain today relatively few cases in which the imposition
of a judicial remedy of tort damages would not impinge directly
upon an established administrative mechanism for resolving disputes
between a public employer and its employees." ' 6 The court in
Lamphere School v. Lamphere Federation of Teachers stressed the
need to avoid judicial interference, holding that "[c]ourts venture
into dangerous and basically uncharitable waters when they 'tinker'
with existing legislative schemas."' 167 In Burke & Thomas Inc. v.
International Organization of Masters, the court expressed the belief
that allowing third party lawsuits would render the action of the
164. City and County of San Francisco v. Local 38, 42 Cal. 3d 810, 816, 726 P.2d 538,
542, 230 Cal. Rptr. 856, 860 (1986).
165. 347 U.S. 656, 671 (1953) (Douglas J., dissenting). Justice Douglas' prediction about
labor cases dragging through the courts has been confirmed. The Local 38 strike took place
in 1976. The Burns transit strike took place in 1980. A final ruling was handed down in 1983,
but only before the case had been heard at each of the three main levels of the New York
court system.
At the time of this publication Boyle v. Anderson Firefighters Ass'n. was still being appealed.
See supra note 31. Recently, in Rivard v. Chicago Firefighters Union, 145 II1. App. 3d 207,
494 N.E.2d 756 (1986), it was held that the union, as an unincorporated association, could be
sued in its own name. This decision is on appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court. The strike
which gave rise to this case occurred in 1980.
166. Local 38, 42 Cal. 3d at 816, 726 P.2d at 542, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
167. Lamphere School v. Lamphere Fed'n of Teachers, 400 Mich. 104, 131, 252 N.W.2d
818, 830 (1977).
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public service commission "a meaningless exercise, since enormous
penalties not subject to their control could be imposed on one of
the parties.""16 The court added that employer suits would also be
highly undesirable because "the employer would have a powerful
penalty within its control which is not subject to the commission's
jurisdiction, further eroding the authority of that body to equitably
adjust the dispute."' 169
It has also been recognized that the utilization of damage actions
to prevent strikes may result in prolonging those walkouts that do
occur. 70 This position was accepted by the court in Burns, Jackson,
& Miller v. Lindner although it was held not to be sufficient grounds
to pre-empt third party action.17 ' In Lamphere School v. Lamphere
Federation of Teachers, the court stated the "[e]ventual settlements
could be prolonged pending the resolution of multiple tort claims
and counterclaims ... and, at the same time, exacerbate labor-
management disputes."' 7 2 Similar sentiments were expressed in Local
38. Local 38 held that such tort actions "may have a destablizing
effect, prolonging public employee strikes and exacerbating inequal-
ities in bargaining power."' 73
This concern regarding the balance of bargaining positions and the
possible ruinous effect of damage actions on public employee unions
has been noted by both courts and commentators. 74 These consid-
erations were a key factor in Local 38. The court concluded its
discussion of public policy issues by stating, "judicial intervention
to weight the bargaining balance in favor of public employers, by
threatening to impose ruinous judgments of unions, is not a desirable
or workable method of dealing with public employee strikes."' 75
Lamphere stated that the "uneasy balance of labor- management
power which exists in the public sector could easily be upset" by
permitting employer suits.' 76 The. Burns court expressed the same
168. Burke & Thomas v. Int'l Org. of Masters, 600 P.2d 1282, 1289 (Wash. 1978).
169. Id.
170. Note, Private Damage Actions, supra note 64, at 1320.
171. Burns, Jackson, & Miller v. Lindner, 59 N.Y.2d 315, 331, 451 N.E.2d 459, 466, 464
N.Y.S.2d 712, 720 (1983).
172. Lamphere School v. Lamphere Fed'n of Teachers, 400 Mich. 104, 131, 252 N.W.2d
818, 830 (1977).
173. Local 38, 42 Cal. 3d at 818, 726 P.2d at 543, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
174. See, e.g., Note, Private Damage Actions, supra note 64, at 1320; Note, Prima Facie
Tort, supra note 66, at 699. This problem has also been noted by the federal courts. See,
e.g., Nat'l Airlines v. Airline Pilots Assn. Intern., 431 F. Supp. 53, 54 (S.D. Fla. 1976).
175. Local 38, 42 Cal. 3d at 818, 726 P.2d at 543, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
176. Lamphere, 400 Mich. at 131, 252 N.W.2d at 830.
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attitude toward third party damage claims, indicating that such
actions would impose a crushing burden on unions and striking
employees. 177 The court in Burns added that the imposition of unlim-
ited per se liability "would inevitably upset the delicate balance
established after twenty years of legislative pondering."'7 8
It has been suggested that the bargaining balance should not be
considered in weighing the pros and cons of permitting damage
actions. One commentator states that "this view implies that the
legislature intended that the possibility of public employee strikes
play a role in the bargaining relationship, which seems unlikely in
light of the explicit prohibition of such strikes.' 1 79 Regardless of the
merits of this contention, it must be questioned whether injecting
another destablizing influence into the already volatile world of public
sector labor relations is really in the interest of the general public.
A final policy-based objection arises from the large number of
persons usually affected by a public sector strike. Defendant unions
sometimes raise the specter of innumerable lawsuits as a justification
against approving employer or third party damage actions. The
Michigan Supreme Court in Lamphere Schools v. Lamphere Feder-
ation of. Teachers feared that allowing employers to sue public
employee unions would create "labor law logjams."' 80 One commen-
tator has suggested that the principles of foreseeability and causation
be applied to limit the number of plaintiffs entitled to sue under the
theories of implied right of action and third party beneficiary.' 8'
The fears expressed in Lamphere, however, may be exaggerated.
The use of class action suits are unlikely unless the union has
significant assets. 182 Thus, a fear of clogging the courts, even in our
litigious society, may be the least important ramification in permitting
damage actions against public sector unions.
Those favoring damage suits are not necessarily unmindful of the
aforementioned policy considerations. In limiting the scope of its
ruling to firefighters' strikes, the State v. Kansas City Firefighters
177. Burns, 59 N.Y.2d at 329, 451 N.E.2d at 465, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 718.
178. Id. at 330, 451 N.E.2d at 466, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 719.
179. Note, Private Damage Actions, supra note 64, at 1320.
180. Lamphere, 400 Mich. at 131, 252 N.W.2d at 830.
181. Note, Private Damage Actions, supra note 64, at 1327.. Another commentator suggests
limiting a right of action to firefighter and police strikes. See, Note, Illegal Public Employee
Strikes, supra note 66, at 309.
182. See Note, Statutory and Common Law Considerations, supra note 40, at 1301. Note,
Damage Liability, supra note 6, at 1101, n.87 (in jurisdictions allowing civil damage actions
against illegally striking unions, no such suits had occurred).
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court stated, "[w]e agree that sound judicial policy prompts that a
court refrain from a rampant exercise of its coercive power in this
delicate area of public employment." 83 However, any adverse effects
are deemed of lesser importance than protecting the public and
maintaining public services. 84 The prevailing public policy is ex-
pressed in statutory or common law pronouncements declaring public
sector strikes to be unlawful.
Those favoring damage actions indicate that the threat of lawsuits
will deter illegal strikes. As one commentator claims, "a civil remedy,
in addition to specified sanctions, could force union officials to think
long and hard before authorizing a strike."18 5 The Kansas City court
expressed this in stating, "[a] private cause of action will impose a
cost the decision to strike must reckon with.'
8 6
Another aspect of the deterrent argument raises the possiblity that
employers will waive statutory penalties to get essential services back
into operation. In this respect one commentator states that "[t]he
only method that can make a no-strike law mean what it says
regardless of the incumbent in City Hall, the State House, or the
White House, is private enforcement of the law."'18 7 This assertion
was discussed by the Local 38 court. It noted that employer damage
suits would deter weak unions, but that strong labor organizations
could insist that the employer waive its right to tort damages.
8
There is also a significant body of opinion indicating that those
who favor damage actions may be placing undue reliance on the
whole punitive approach toward public sector strikes. As one com-
183. State v. Kansas City Firefighters, 672 S.W.2d 99, 111 (1984).
184. Id. at 110.
185. Note, Prima Facie Tort, supra note 66, at 698. See also, Note, Damage Liability,
supra note 6, at 1189; Note, Private Damage Actions, supra note 64, at 1320. More recent
support for the deterrence argument appears in Egan, The Management Perspective: Can
Damage Suits be Brought Against Strikers and Their Unions?, 26 J. oF LAW & EDUC. 205,
215 (1987). A companion article, however, reiterates the view that such suits may further
disrupt public sector labor relations. Slesnick, The Union Perspective: Can Damage Suits Be
Brought Against Strikers and Their Unions?, 26 J. oF LAw & EDUC. 217, 223-24 (1987).
186. Kansas City, 672 S.W.2d at 110.
187. Armor, The Right to Strike: Some Basic, But Neglected Questions, 2 Gov. UNiON
REv. 204, 210 (1981). It is true that in the past severe penalties were sometimes not enforced.
In re DiMaggio, 19 N.Y.2d 283, 225 N.E.2d 871, 279 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1967), the court stated,
"[i]t is within the realm of common knowledge that the 'automatic' penalty provisions of
Condon-Wadlin have never been enforced (with but two exceptions) over an almost 20-year
period, in which strikes by public employees have been too numerous to recall or record in
this opinion .... " Id. at 289, 225 N.E.2d at 874, 279 N.Y.S.2d at 165. The far more
sophisticated Taylor Law, however, is being enforced. See, e.g., In re Board of Educ. of
Lakeland Central School Dist. of Shrub Oak, 59 A.D.2d 900 (1977); Buffalo Teachers Fed'n,
Inc. v. Helsby, 515 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) aff'd. 676 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1982).
188. 42 Cal. 3d at 818, 726 P.2d at 543, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
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mentator states, "the deterrent effect of current penal provisions is
dubious at best .. "189 Another notes that "while statutes have
banned strikes as a matter of law, even those with the most draconian
sanctions have failed to prevent them as a matter of fact when
bargaining deadlocks occur."' 19
It has also been observed that the threat of punishment may be
counterproductive. One commentator states that "the obvious ineq-
uity of the purely punitive approach may encourage employee strikes
rather than prevent them."' 9' Similar sentiments have been expressed
by noted labor mediator Theodore Kheel. In considering several
strikes that took place during the early years of New York's Taylor
Law, he concluded that rather than preventing these walkouts, the
statute exacerbated them.
92
Some suggest that these arguments would apply only to confron-
tations between the union and its employer or the state. 93 There is
nothing to suggest, however, that unions which are willing to confront
court injunctions and statutory penalties will be deterred by the threat
of third party lawsuits. In fact, at the time the Burns action was
first brought, several labor lawyers were reported as believing that
such a lawsuit would have no deterrent effect on unions. 94
Those favoring damage actions also note the need to compensate
injured parties. With regard to public employers, Justice Lucas in
his Local 38 dissent states that unlawful strikes "can result in
devastating financial injury to the affected municipality. To deprive
public agencies of their right to recompense for such unlawful con-
duct, a right enjoyed by all other persons in the absence of statutory
limitations, is not only unsound but also constitutes unprecedented
discrimination against California municipalities." 1 95 One commenta-
tor expressed the same concern regarding third parties, stating that
"to prohibit these [third party] suits would leave unanswered the
question of justice for [those] citizens who have lost life or property
through intentional wrongdoing.' 1 96
189. Dripps, supra note 1, at 617.
190. Bernstein, Alternatives To The Strike In Public Labor Relations, 85 HARv. L. Rv.
459, 462 (1971).
191. Note, Collective Bargaining for Public Employees and the Prevention of Strikes in
the Public Sector, 68 MICH. L. R-v. 260, 271 (1969).
192. Kheel, Strikes and Public Employment, 67 MIcH. L. Rav. 931, 936 (1969).
193. Note, Private Damage Actions, supra note 64, at 1319.
194. Lawscope, 67 A.B.A. J., 690 (1980).
195. City and County of San Francisco v. Local 38, 42 Cal. 3d 810, 820-21, 726 P.2d 538,
545, 230 Cal. Rptr. 856, 863 (1986) (Lucas, J., dissenting).
196. Note, Illegal Public Employee Strikes, supra note 66, at 309.
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This line of argument, particularly with regard to third parties,
has more appeal than the deterrence contention. However, given the
finite nature of union assets, this argument is only valid in situations
where the number of potential plaintiffs is sharply restricted. In a
sitution where multiple parties could present a viable cause of action,
it is doubtful that any meaningful recovery could be effected. As
one commentator has observed, "compensation available through
tort actions against unions and their members will never equal the
damages inflicted by the strike unless an adequate response to the
supply elasticity problem is found."
197
CONCLUSION
Given the strong negative impact that damage actions against public
sector unions could have, courts have properly restricted the circum-
stances under which these suits may be successfully brought. The per
se theory of union liability promotes the opposite situation and is
unacceptable. The rejection of per se liability by the California
Supreme Court in City and County of San Francisco v. Local 38,
and in other decisions, is desirable.
The deterrent value of damage actions is highly suspect at best.
Nor is there likelihood of individuals gaining adequate compensation
from a public employees union when a strike has caused losses
throughout the community. At the same time, such actions clearly
have the potential to exacerbate disputes, prolong strikes, and most
importantly, undermine coherent public labor policy. Public labor
peace depends on the existende of healthy unions, an equitable
bargaining balance and smoothly functioning administrative proc-
esses; not on additional punitive measures.
Thus, the judicial reaction to the more traditional causes of action
is also acceptable. Citizens affected by strikes where the losses have
been widespread, and where the amounts of damage claims are often
indeterminate or speculative, have little incentive to bring suit. How-
ever, those few plaintiffs who can present compelling evidence of
special damages, most likely when an illegal strike impacts public
health and safety, do have the opportunity to gain recompense
through such actions as public nuisance.
For the most part, judicial decisions have relied upon the appli-
cation of traditional doctrines. However, rejecting liability on grounds
197. Dripps, supra note 1, at 617.
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of public policy, 198 either in part, or almost entirely, as in Local 38,
is appropriate. In an area as sensitive as public sector labor relations,
it is essential that a court be cognizant of the overall impact of its
ruling. Finally, a reliance on public policy to reach a result-oriented
decision is superior to questionable common law interpretations pre-
viously noted.199
Ideally, as so many courts and commentators have observed, the
damage action issue would be best addressed by legislatures. Despite
the generally acceptable trend in court decisions, the present situation
is hardly ideal. Comprehensive legislation would remove much of the
expense, uncertainty and delay which exists when courts, unguided
by any enactment, deal with what is usually a case of first impression.
If employers are to be granted any rights of action, they should
be carefully integrated into a comprehensive public sector labor law.
A better solution would be to keep public sector labor-management
disputes out of the courts entirely. As one commentator notes about
federal labor law, "the NLRB is the only present body with the
expertise necessary to make sophisticated labor law decisions with
any real continuity." 200 This is equally true about state administrative
bodies and state labor law.
With regard to third parties, unions should receive tort immunity,
with narrow exceptions for well documented claims of damages
arising from police or firefighters' strikes. The purpose of such
exceptions should not be any futile exercise in deterrence. Rather,
the aim should be to the compensation of the victim and the
satisfaction of the community's sense of justice.20'
The possibility of such legislation in the near future is, however,
not great. Thus, in the absence of legislative guidance, courts faced
with damage suits against public sector unions should, in the interest
of sound public labor policy, adhere to the current trend of restricting
the circumstances under which such claims may be brought.
198. See Brachtenbach, Public Policy in Judicial Decisions, 21 GoNz. L. REv. 1, 1-6 (1986);
Hopkins, Public Policy and the Formation of a Rule of Law, 37 BROOKLYN L. REv. 323
(1971).
199. See supra notes 116-117, 124, 139 and accompanying text.
200. Gregory, supra note 43, at 531.
201. The public has shown it will tolerate teachers and transit strikes, but those involving
police and fire services are another matter. On the subject of these strikes, see Wohlers, The
Legal Realities of the Hardball Game of Firefighter and Police Strikes, 15 IDAMO L. REv. 39
(1978).
